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NOTES
Dworkin's "Rights Thesis"
For the past fifteen years, a debate over the nature of judicial
decision-making has figured prominently in the literature of jurisprudence. The central figures in the debate have been H.L.A. Hart1 and
his defenders,2 on one side, and Ronald Dworkin3 on the other.
Recently, in an article entitled Hard Cases,4 Dworkin published the
most comprehensive and systematic statement of his theory of how
judges should decide cases. This Note provides a textual exegesis
and critique of Hard Cases within the context of the larger Hart~
Dworkin debate. 5
In his most important work, The Concept of Law, H.L.A. Hart
suggests that the legal rules judges employ to decide cases typically
possess a certain indeterminacy or vagueness in certain areas:
All rules involve recognizing or classifying particular cases as instances of general terms, and in the case of everything which we are
prepared to call a rule it is possible to distinguish clear central cases,
where it certainly applies and others where there are reasons for both
asserting and denying that it applies. Nothing can eliminate this duality of a core of certainty and a penumbra of doubt when we are
engaged in bringing particular situations under general rules. This
imparts to all rules a fringe of vagueness or "open texture". . . .6

Hart argues that when a case arises within the "open texture" of a
legal rule, a judge exercises "discretion" 7 to make "a choice between
1. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961); Problems of the Philosophy
of Law, 6 ENCYC. OF PHILOSOPHY 264 (1967).
2. See, e.g., Raz, Legal Principles and the Limits of Law, 81 YALE L.J. 823
(1972).
3. See Dworkin, Judicial Discretion, 60 J. PmL. 624 (1963) [hereinafter Judicial
Discretion]; The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14 (1967) [hereinafter The
Model of Rules], reprinted in EssAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 25-60 (R. Summers ed.
1968); Social Rules and Legal Theory, 81 YALE LJ. 855 (1972); [hereinafter Social
Rules and Legal Theory]; Hard Cases, 88 HARv. E. REV. 1057 (1975) [hereinafter
Hard Cases].
4. Supra note 3.
5. For other discussions concerning the nature of judicial adjudication within the
parameters of the Hart-Dworkin debate, see Greenawalt, Discretion and Judicial
Decision: Tlze Elusive Quest for the Fetters That Bind Judges, 15 COLUM. L. REV.
359 (1975), and Sartorius, Social Policy and Judicial Legislation, 8 AM. PHIL. Q. 151
(1971). Additional references are cited throughout these discussions.
6. H.L.A. HART, supra note 1, at 119-20.
1. Id. at 124.
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open alternatives," 8 and thus engages in a "creative or legislative
activity." 9 Because open alternatives exist in uncertain cases, "there
is no possibility of treating the question raised by the various cases as
if there were one uniquely correct answer to be found, as distinct
from an answer which is a reasonable compromise between many
conflicting interests."10 This "creative" function of courts, Hart asserts, is similar to "the exercise of delegated rule-making powers by
an administrative body."11 Dworkin has interpreted the positivists,12
with whom he identifies Hart, as contending that a judge who runs
out of rules exercises "strong discretion" in the sense that "he is not
bound by any standards from the authority of law . . . ." 13 Accordingly, the judge is free to reach "beyond the law for some other sort of
standard to guide him in manufacturing a fresh legal rule or supplementing an old one." 14
Dworkin disagrees with several of the major tenets of Hart's
theory. He contends, first, that judges are never free to exercise
"strong discretion" in deciding issues of law, even in cases in which
no legal rule dictates a clear result. 15 When a judge runs out of
8, Id.
9. Id. at 131.
10. Id. at 128.
11. Id. at 132.
12. Dworkin states the tenets of positivism as follows:
(a) The law of a community is a set of special rules • . . • These special
rules can be identified and distinguished by specific criteria, by tests having to
do not with their content but with their pedigree or the manner in which they
were adopted or developed. These tests of pedigree can be used to distinguish
valid legal rules from spurious legal rules . . . and also from other sorts of social rules (generally lumped together as "moral rules") that the community
follows but does not enforce through public power.
(b) The set of these valid legal rules is exhaustive of "the law," so that if
someone's case is not clearly covered by such a rule • . • then that case cannot
be decided by "applying the law." It must be decided by some official, like a
judge, "exercising his discretion," which means reaching beyond the law for
some other sort of standard to guide him in manufacturing a fresh legal rule or
supplementing an old one.
(c) To say that someone has a "legal obligation" is to say that his case
falls under a valid legal rule that requires him to do or to forbear from doing
something. . . . In the absence of such a valid legal rule there is no legal
obligation; it follows that when the judge decides an issue by exercising his discretion, he is not enforcing a legal obligation as to that issue.
The Model of Rules, supra note 3, at 17-18.
13. Id. at 35. But see Greenawalt, supra note 5, at 368-99 (questioning whether
it is feasible to draw a hard and fast line between Dworkin's strong discretion in the
sense of "freedom to choose" and his weak discretion in the sense of "judgment").
Contra, Reynolds, Dworkin as Quixote, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 574 (1975) (arguing
that by "discretion" Hart simply means that a judge must use his best judgmelll by
appealing to public standards in resolving borderline cases).
14. The Model of Rules, supra note 3, at 17.
15. Dworkin has not denied that judges are sometimes granted discretion as, for
example, in fixing criminal sentences. See Judicial Discretion, supra note 3, at 634
n.6; Social Rules and Legal Theory, supra note 3, at 881.
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"textbook rules," 16 Dworkin asserts, he must base his decision not on
nonlegal standards or norms, but rather on what may be called legal
principles.17 Legal principles, in Dworkin's view, are as much a part
of the law as are the black-letter rules, and are equally binding on
judges. Moreover, while no single principle is dispositive of a given
case, a fair consideration of all relevant principles points to a uniquely
correct answer in even the hardest of cases. Because of this, Dworkin
concludes, the Anglo-American legal system is gapless, and judges
are·never free to engage in creative judicial legislation. Accordingly,
the law remains "an arrangement of entitlements" 18 even within the
area that Hart has termed the "open texture" of the legal system's
rules. As Rolf Sartorius, who shares Dworkin's rejection of judicial
discretion, explains, "[A] litigant before a court of law is not in the
position of one begging a favor from a potential benefactor, but
rather in that of one demanding a particular decision as a matter of
right, as something to which the law entitles him." 19
A second area of debate finds Hart and Sartorius aligned against
Dworkin. The controversy concerns Hart's thesis that fully developed legal systems have a social "rule of recognition" that identifies
authoritatively all the rules of the system and that thus can be used by
judges to isolate the standards they must consider in deciding hard
cases. 20 Although Sartorius agrees with Dworkin that judges are
bound to ascertain the uniquely correct legal solution in each case, he
accepts Hart's contention that a social rule of recognition may serve to
distinguish legal principles from nonlegal norms. But for Sartorius,
such a rule actually provides a powerful argument against Hart's view
that judges have discretion to choose among extralegal principles and
norms. If judges can identify which principles are legal and which
are not, then even in borderline cases in which the textbook rules do
not clearly dictate a result, a judge can nonetheless be certain to stay
within the bounds of legal standards. 21
Dworkin denies that there can be any social criterion or set of
social criteria that can effectively identify all of the standards a judge
16. Judicial Discretion, supra note 3, at 625.
17. See Judicial Discretion, supra note 3, at 634-35. See also The Model of
Rules, supra note 3, at 22-23; Social Rules and Legal Theory, supra note 3, at 855.
Some writers have questioned whether Dworkin's notion of "rule" is unduly narrow.
For example, one has suggested that Hart's use of this term is broader than
Dworkin's: "By 'rules' [Hart] means what Professor Dworkin seems to mean by
'standards,' namely rules, principles or any other type of norm ( whether legal or
social)." Raz, supra note 2, at 845.
18. Judicial Discretion, supra note 3, at 634 n.7.
19. Sartorious, supra note 5, at 153. See also Sartorious, The Justification of the
Judicial Decision, 78 Ennes 171 (1968).
20. See H.L.A. HART, supra note 1, at 92.
21. See Sartorious, supra note 5, at 155.
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must consider. 22 In a reply to Sartorius, he explains that any such
rule of recognition cannot be a social rule, as Hart supposes, but must
itself be a normative rule 23 inextricably bound to moral and political
theory. 24 Dworkin agrees that, in one sense, the institutional support
for a principle can serve as a kind of complex rule of recognition-a
rule to the effect that "a principle is a principle of law if it figures in
the soundest theory of law that can be provided as a justification for
the explicit substantive and institutional rules of the jurisdiction in
question." 25 But the judicial development of a soundest theory of
law necessarily involves an appeal to moral and political principles,20
which cannot be identified by using a social rule.
In Hard Cases Dworkin attempts to explore more fully the notion
of the "soundest theory of law" (though not in these words), and to
demonstrate with greater precision the role played by moral and
political theory in its construction and application. 27 He aims to
prove that the Anglo-American system of law is indeed gapless ("a
seamless web") 28 and hence is a system of entitlements in which there
is never room for judges to play the role of "deputy legislators. "20 'It
is not altogether clear whether Dworkin also means to contend that
all legal systems are gapless, but this is unlikely since it is not difficult
to imagine a legal system in which the judiciary is vested, at least at
times, with legislative-like powers. If so, Dworkin's argument is best
understood as describing a counter-example to Hart's concept of law,
and not as defining an essential feature of a legal system.
Dworkin's principal contention in Hard Cases, entitled "the rights
thesis," is that "judicial decisions in civil cases, even in hard cases
. . ., characteristically are and should be generated by principle not
22. See The Model of Rules, supra note 3, at 40-45; Social Rules and Legal
Theory, supra note 3 at 869-70.
23. The distinction between "social" rules and "normative" rules is one that
Dworkin draws, see Social Rules and Legal Theory, supra note 3, at 857-68. For
example, when a sociologist describes a behavioral practice, such as the wont of male
churchgoers to remove their hats before entering church, Dworkin defines the
behavioral practice as a social rule. However, if the churchgoer himself were to
appeal to this rule, or were to criticize another for its infringement, then the
churchgoer, by Dworkin's definition, would be appealing to a normative rule. Id. at
859-60. Dworkin criticizes Hart for conflating this distinction between social and
normative rules. Thus, in explicating Hart's theory, he writes: "If, in a particular
community, [judges] (a) regularly apply the rules laid down by the legislature in
reaching their decisions, (b) justify this practice by appeal to 'the rule' that judges
must follow the legislature, and (c) censure any official who does not follow that
rule, then, on Hart's theory, this community can be said to have a social rule that
judges must follow the legislature.'' Id. at 859.
24. Social Rules and Legal Theory, supra note 3, at 869-70, 875-78.
25. Id. at 876 (emphasis added). See text at notes 89-92 infra.
26. See text at note 103 infra.
27. See text at notes 100-01 & note 103 infra.
28. Hard Cases, supra note 3, at 1093-96.
29. Id. at 1058.
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policy."30 The rights thesis provides that judges decide hard cases
"by confirming or denying concrete rights" after considering all
relevant principles. 31 Since there is only one correct adjudication of
rights in every case, one litigant always has the right to win, 32 a right
that Dworkin views as a "genuine political right." 33 Even in a "hard
case"-"when no settled rule dictates a decision either way" 34-it is a
judge's legal obligation to determine which party has an institutional
right to win. 35 As a consequence, a judge is never free to strike out
on his own and weigh conflicting social policies. 36 Rather, his
decisions must be determined by legal principles applied consistently
in like cases.
This Note argues that the rights thesis is untenable. It shows that
Dworkin's distinction between arguments of principle and arguments
of policy, upon which the rights thesis is based, cannot withstand
close scrutiny. The Note questions whether it is sensible to speak
of an objectively soundest theory of law, and argues that, even if such
a theory is feasible, Dworkin has failed to prove that it will always
dictate a unique result (or, put in different words, that the rights
thesis is part of the putative soundest theory). If Dworkin's idea of a
soundest theory is oppugned, or if the rights thesis is not part of that
theory, then the rights thesis must be renounced. The criticisms
presented in this Note do not, however, undermine a fundamental
insight underlying Dworkin's rights thesis-that judges face certain
30. Hard Cases, supra note 3, at 1060. The rights thesis, as stated, has both a
descriptive and a normative component. This Note, however, restricts its discussion
to the latter. For a view of judicial adjudication consistent with Dworkin's position
that judges should not base their decisions on social policies, see Sartorius, supra note
5, at 158.
31. Hard Cases, supra note 3, at 1078. See text at note 89 infra.
32. Hard Cases, supra note 3, at 1082. See text at notes 89-90 infra.
33. Hard Cases, supra note 3, at 1066 (emphasis added).
34. Id. at 1060. Dworkin has provided a more complete catalogue of the various
kinds of "hard cases":
(i) In many cases a court is pressed to, and in some cases does, overrule a textbook rule, and substitute a new one. (ii) Even when, as is more often the case,
a court is determined to follow a particular textbook rule if it applies, that rule
may be so ambiguous that it is not clear whether it applies, and the court cannot
decide simply by studying the language in which the rule has been expressed.
(iii) Sometimes two textbook rules by their terms apply, and the judges must
choose between them. In some such cases the need for choice may be disguised,
in that only one rule is mentioned, but research (or imagination) would disclose
another rule that the court could have adopted as easily. (iv) Sometimes a
court itself will state that no textbook rule applies to the facts. Often the gap
may be cured by what is called "expansion" of an existing rule, but sometimes
a wholly new rule must be invented. (v) A large, and increasing, number of
cases are decided by citing rules so vague that it is often unhelpful even to call
them ambiguous: the critical words in such rules are "reasonable", "ordinary
and necessary", "material", "significant", and the like.
Judicial Discretion, supra note 3, at 627.
35. Hard Cases, supra note 3, at 1078, 1108.
36. For Hart's opposing view, see text at notes 7-11 supra.
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institutional constraints not placed upon legislators. The final section
of the Note explores the nature of these constraints by examining the
"universalizability" of judgments of moral and legal obligation. The
thesis presented here is that the central role played by the doctrine of
precedent in judicial adjudication, and the requirement that like cases
be treated alike, can best be explained as a product of normative
reasoning. This thesis steers a middle course between Hart's position
-that judges exercise a legislative-like discretion in cases within the
open texture of legal rules, and Dworkin's contrary view that there is
a uniquely correct legal solution in every civil case.

I.

PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES

A. Distinctions Under the Rights Thesis
The rights thesis relies heavily upon Dworkin's distinction between principles, upon which judges must ground their reasoning,
and.policies, the weighing of which they must eschew. By introducing this distinction Dworkin hopes to avoid certain difficulties that
attach to positivist jurisprudence, according to which a judge is free to
"exercise an independent discretion to legislate on issues which the
law does not reach." 37 One such difficulty is to reconcile an activist
judiciary with the democratic ideal that a community should be
governed ·by elected officials who remain responsible to the electorate.
Because appointed judges are largely insulated from the political
majority, they should not be vested with the power to determine
which goals best serve the general welfare and to find compromises
among the various conflicting inter~sts and goals in particular situations. 38 The second such difficulty is that judges who create new law
necessarily impose new legal duties ex post facto on the losing parties,
and thus give rise to valid complaints of "unfair surprise." 30
Dworkin believes that these two objections have no force when
judicial decisions are grounded only on "principles." It is submitted,
however, that Dworkin's model is no more successful in avoiding this
danger of judicial activism than is the jurisprudential camp he attacks. To demonstrate this, it is necessary first to consider Dworkin's
suggested distinction between principles and policies.
As Dworkin explains, "[a]rguments of policy justify a political
decision by showing that the decision advances or protects some
collective goal of the community as a whole," while "[a]rguments of
principle justify a political decision by showing that the decision
37. Hard Cases, supra note, 3 at 1103.
38. Id. at 1061-62.
39. Id. Dworkin briefly alludes to these two objections in Judicial Discretion,
supra note 3, at 638. He also discusses the second objection in The Model of Rules,
supra note 3, at 31, 45. For a general discussion of ex post facto law, see Note, Ex
Post Facto Limitations on Legislative Power, 73 MrcH. L. RBv. 1491 (1975).
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respects or secures some individual or group right." 40 In short,
"[p]rinciples are propositions that describe rights; policies are propositions that describe goals." 41 To comprehend the significance of this
distinction, we must in turn examine what Dworkin means by a
"collective goal" and a "right." Both, he argues, are species of
"political aims":
A political theory takes a certain state of affairs as a political aim
if, for that theory, it counts in favor of any political decision that the
decision is likely to advance, or to protect, that state of affairs, and
counts against the decision that it will retard or endanger it. A
political right is an individuated political aim. An individual has a
right to some opportunity or resource or liberty if it counts in favor
of a political decision that the decision is likely to advance or protect
the state of affairs in which he enjoys the right, even when no other
political aim is served and some political aim is disserved thereby,
and counts against that decision that it will retard or endanger that
state of affairs, even when some other political aim is thereby served.
A goal is a nonindividuated political aim, that is, a state of affairs
whose specification does not in this way call for any particular opportunity or resource or liberty for particular individuals. 42

Three characteristics that distinguish rights and goals, and hence
principles from policies, can be discerned from this passage and from
Dworkin's subsequent elaboration. First, rights are "individuated" in
the sense that they bestow certain entitlements on particular individuals. 43 Goals are "nonindividuated" in that they do not attach to
40. Hard Cases, supra note 3, at 1059. The importance of the distinction
between principles and policies has developed in Dworkin's thinking over a period of
time. In an early paper, Judicial Discretion, supra note 3, Dworkin attached little
weight to this distinction. At one point in his argument against discretion, he
considered the hypothetical baseball-like game of "Policies" in which "[a]ll the rules
of baseball are initially in force, but the umpires • . . are required in each case to
consider whether alteration of the pertinent rule would bring the game closer to the
realization of certain fixed policies, or make it more consistent with certain fixed
principles, and, if so, to make the necessary alteration before deciding the play." Id.
at 629. He contended that "[o]n every play the participants are entitled to the
'correct' result; on no play is the [umpire] entitled to decide as he wishes." Id. at
631. Dworkin's position was clearly that "Policies" is a system of entitlements. In
The Model of Rules, supra note 3, although generally using "principle" generically to
designate "the whole set of . . . standards other than rules," id. at 22-23, Dworkin
distinguished between a "policy" as "that kind of standard that sets out a goal to be
reached" and a "principle" as "a standard that is to be observed, not because it will
advance or secure an economic, political, or social situation deemed desirable, but
because it is a requirement of justice or fairness or some other dimension of
morality." Id. at 23. In Hard Cases, Dworkin, as indicated, sharply articulated his
perceived distinction between policies and principles since, by this time, he had come
to the view that law can be a system of entitlements only if judicial decisions are
generated by principles.
41. Hard Cases, supra note 3, at 1067.
42. Id. at 1067-68 (emphasis added).
43. Dworkin does not mean to say that rights cannot attach to all citizens. On
the contrary, he assumes that all political rights attach to all members in the
community. Id. at 1070-71 n.6.
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individuals. In order to determine whether a particular right has
been infringed, therefore, it is sufficient to examine the facts pertaining to a single individual; but to determine whether or not a particular
goal has been abandoned, it is necessary to do more than examine the
facts pertaining to any single individual.
Second, goals are political aims that are typically balanced and
weighed against one another in a utilitarian calculus, with the result
that "offering less of some benefit to one man can be justified simply
by showing that this will lead to a greater benefit overall."44 Rights,
however, while they may also be weighed against one another, have as
a matter of definition a certain "threshold weight" against "ordinary,
routine goals" and can be outweighed only by "a goal of special
urgency." 45 Thus, whether a political aim is a right or a goal
depends on its relative weight within the underlying theory as a
ground for justifying judicial decisions. 46
Third, fairness, in Dworkin's view, requires the consistent enforcement of individual rights, but not the consistent promotion of
collective goals. Thus, "it need not be a part of a responsible strategy
for reaching a collective goal that individuals be treated alike." 47
Moreover, a government that serves a collective goal on one occasion
need not serve that same goal when a similar occasion arises, or serve
it in the same way. "[A] responsible government may serve different goals in a piecemeal and occasional fashion, so that even though it
does not regret [sic], but continues to enforce, one rule designed to
serve a particular goal, it may reject other rules that would serve that
same goal just as well." 48 If the government recognizes a certain
right of its citizens, on the other hand, it has an obligation to effect an
equal distribution of the benefit of that right. 49
With these differences between principles and policies in mind, it
is possible to consider Dworkin's suggestion that his theory, unlike
Hart's, accords with the democratic ideal that collective goals be
established by elected officials. The ideal is violated by Hart's theory, Dworkin states, because judges are ill-fitted to engage in the
juggling of competing interests that arguments of policy require. Yet,
is a judge really in a better, or even different, position if he must
44. Id. at 1068.
45. Id. at 1069. By the "weight" of a right, Dworkin means "its power to
withstand . . . competition" from other goals and rights. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1064.
48. Id. at 1092. Nevertheless, Dworkin suggests that even in the pursuit of
collective goals there are at least some "weak requirements" of fairness that prohibit
"grossly unfair distributions." But such minimal requirements are consistent with the
government's granting certain benefits to one group to promote a chosen goal while
denying similar benefits to other groups. Id.
49. Id. at 1064, 1094.
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determine what weight to accord to the various political aims in his
theory of law? Given Dworkin's distinction between rights and
goals, it is doubtful that he would be.
Rights and goals, for Dworkin, 50 arguably are types of political
aims that differ in degree but not in kind. A political aim, as noted
above, counts as a "right" within a political theory only if it has
sufficient threshold weight to override less than "urgent" collective
goals of the community. 51 Thus, whether a political aim functions as
a right or goal in some political theory depends on its relative weight
in that theory. 52 Yet, the procedure by which a judge arrives at the
relative weight of a particular political aim is not apt to be significantly
less violative of the democratic ideal than a judically determined
balancing of competing policy considerations. Moreover, a judge
must also determine whether a collective goal is "urgent," in which
case it may be able to override competing rights.
Rarely would a judge be able to conclude that a political aim is a
right without engaging in some type of weighing of competing interests. A judge at times might be able to identify a right simply by
looking to, for example, the language of the Constitution. The very
fact that something appears as an unmistakable constitutional entitlement ordinarily would ensure it the status of a right in any sound
theory of law. In such clear-cut cases, a judge would not be required
to weigh the aim in question against all other aims to determine
whether it stands as a right or a goal. But in the hard cases that are
Dworkin's concern, the differentiation will not always be obvious to a
judge simply from examining a particular passage in the Constitution
and relevant interpretative cases. It is only by referring to a political
theory, which in some manner construes the Constitution, that a
judge can conclude that certain language gives rise to a right. 53 And,
it is only the standing of a political aim vis-a-vis other political aims
within the judge'& political theory that enables him to determine
whether it is a right. Dworkin himself underscores this difficulty by
50. The argument that follows is limited to Dworkin's definition of rights and
goals.
51. See text at note 45 supra.
52. Dworkin wants to say that this is not only a definition of a right, but is
equally a means of recognizing a right in a theory of law. It is irrelevant that a
theoretician might call a certain political aim a "right" if it does not in fact occupy
the requisite function in his theory: "Suppose, for example, some man says he
recognizes the right of free speech, but adds that free speech must yield whenever its
exercise would inconvenience the public. He means, I take it, that he recognizes the
pervasive goal of . • . liberty of speech . . . . His political position is exhausted by
the collective goal; the putative right adds nothing and there is no point to recognizing it as a right at all." Hard Cases, supra note 3, at 1069.
53. "If a public official has anything like a coherent political theory that he uses,
even intuitively, to justify the particular decisions he reaches, then this theory will
recognize a wide variety of different types of rights, arranged in some way that
assigns rough relative weight to each." Id. (emphasis added).
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admitting that a political aim may be a goal in one political theory,
but function as a right in a different theory. 54
The other differences between rights and goals discerned from
Dworkin's account also provide no grounds for concluding that the
two are different in kind, and hence that decisions based on principles
are essentially different from decisions based on policies. In Dworkin's view, rights are individuated while goals are not. Yet, a political aim stated in an individuated form can always be readily recast
into an aim in nonindividuated form, and vice versa. li 5 Thus, freedom of speech, an example suggested by Dworkin, can be viewed
either as a right or as a collective goal. 56 This difference, therefore,
is of little assistance in deciding whether a particular political aim
should stand as a right or a goal. That determination still depends
on the weight accorded the political aim in a given theory of law.
This is not to say, of course, that a particular theory of law will
remain unchanged if a right is transmuted into a goal, nor that an
argument of policy will be as powerful as the parallel argument of
principle; indeed, neither is true since rights ex hypothesi have greater
weight than collective goals. 57
Likewise, the third difference between rights and goals-Dworkin's contention that fairness requires that rights be consistently enforced-provides no independent basis for determining whether a
political aim is a right or a goal. When political aims come into
conflict, it is relatively more difficult to outweigh a right than it is to
outweigh a goal; therefore, it is more difficult within any given
political theory to justify a refusal to respect a right than to justify a
refusal to respect a goal. This distinction is itself a consequence of
the greater weight and importance that rights are accorded in a
political theory. It might also derive from the greater importance
that rights have to individuals. But the special requirement of fairness in the enforcement of rights, though understandable, does not
itself provide judges with a factor to be used in separating rights from
goals.
Dworkin's rights thesis depends on the establishment of a firm
line between arguments of principle and arguments of policy. But as
just seen, there can be no such hard and fast line even using Dworkin's own analysis. If the difference between rights and goals is
simply a matter of their relative weight in a political theory, then, at
least in hard cases, judges must still juggle competing political aims
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1069, 1073; The Model of Rules, supra note 3, at 23 ("The distinction
[between principles and policies] can be collapsed by construing a principle as stating
a goal •.. or by construing a policy as stating a principle •.•").
56. See note 52 supra.
51. Hard Cases, supra note 3, at 1073, 1077.
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and weigh their strength. Indeed, simply to determine in a hard case
that a particular political aim is to count as a right and not as a goal, a
judge must often look to the "soundest" theory and weigh the aim
against other competing aims to determine whether it has the requisite
threshold weight to override routine goals. 58 Of course, if it is
evident from the history of governing legal institutions that a certain
political aim has been traditionally accorded the status of a right, then
the "soundest" theory will ordinarily be required to assign the aim the
same status. 50 That is, a judge may be able to conclude that a political
aim is a right simply by discerning from prior opinions that courts haye
traditionally treated the aim as individuated, as worthy of consistent
enforcement in competition with social goals, and as possessing the
requisite threshold weight. Yet the legal history of a political aim
will not always be so clear that weighing can be avoided. Furthermore, even if it is manifest that some political aim has been traditionally recognized as a right, a judge may sometimes still have to balance
this right against social goals. For, as we have seen, a right under
Dworkin's theory can withstand competition from "ordinary, routine"
goals, but it may be overcome by a goal of "special urgency." 60 To
this extent, at least, even rights and goals must be balanced against
one another.
The rights thesis suggests that judges, when making decisions,
should only consider what might be called "important" political aims. 61
But to require judges in hard cases to decide which aims are important
and which are unimportant (that is, to determine which aims have
standing as rights, and which goals are "urgent") is to require them
to balance and "compromise competing interests in their chambers" 62
in a way that Dworkin finds objectionable. Whether judges make
arguments of principle or arguments of policy (per Dworkin's definitions), they are really doing essentially the same kind of thing, and
not, as the rights thesis necessarily supposes, qualitatively different
kinds of things. If so, the rights thesis is fatally subverted. 63
58. See text at notes 50-53 & notes 52, 53 supra.
59. This will not hold true if there has been a "mistake."
60. See text at note 45 supra.
61. For a critique of Dworkin's "no discretion" thesis in which it is argued that
the process of fixing the relative importance of principles is itself an important area
of judicial discretion, see Raz, supra note 2, at 846.
62. Hard Cases, supra note 3, at 1061. One criticism Dworkin makes of a judge's
compromise of competing interests is that "[i]t is far from clear that interpersonal
comparisons of utility or preference, through which such compromises might be made
objectively, make sense even in theory; but in any case no proper calculus is available
in practice." Id. But see Brandt, The Interpersonal Comparison of Utility, forthcoming as a chapter in R. BRANDT, A THEORY OF THE GOOD AND THE RIGHT (originally
read as a paper at the Western Division Meeting of the American Philosophical
Association, May 1971) (arguing that some interpersonal comparisons of wanting are
justified).
63. To reach this conclusion, however, is not to concede that judges are free to
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The second objection to positivist jurisprudence is that judges
who "make" law by exercising their discretion create and impose legal
duties ex post facto. 64 Dworkin's model of adjudication attempts to
avoid this difficulty by stating that the winning plaintiff had a right to
recover and that, accordingly, the defendant had a duty all along to
avoid the wrongful conduct for which he is now held liable. oG But in
a hard case, surely, no safe predictions concerning the outcome can
be made when the matter is first raised in litigation. In such circumstances, the rights model of adjudication can provide little solace to
the defendant who receives notice that his conduct is wrongful only in
retrospect. Dworkin admits that new principles may be discovered
that "best explain" existing legal history, though they have never
before been articulated. 66 From the viewpoint of the unwitting
defendant, whose loss is based on such a new explanation, these
cases merely serve to frustrate the reliance he reasonably placed on
the rules and principles of law that were previously articulated.
Perhaps Dworkin's point, however, is merely that his model is
theoretically superior to the positivists' model in meeting the objection
of retroactive adjudication. Since, according to the rights thesis,
there is only one proper judgment possible in civil cases, then it might
be said that unvoiced and perhaps previously unknown legal duties do
exist prior to their expression as new principles in the opinions of
hard cases. But if one important rationale behind the established
principle nulla poena sine lege is to provide an individual with fair
warning that the acts he intends are unlawful, 67 then this theoretical
victory is Pyrrhic. For it is certainly a novel and troublesome interpretation of this principle that a defendant could have perceived his
legal duty only if he had been an omniscient legal genius. In short;
Dworkin's model possesses no clear advantage over that of the positivists in avoiding the retroactive creation of legal duties.
The Note thus far has considered two objections that Dworkin
voices against positivist jurisprudence, but which are not surmounted
by his own legal theory. It has suggested, first, that even Dworkinys
analysis of rights and goals leads to the result that judges must weigh
and compromise political aims in hard cases. This conclusion underweigh and compromise political aims ab initio as legislators properly might. Clearly,
judges are limited in an important sense by the rules and principles inherent in the
institutional history of the Anglo-American system of law. Dworkin is right that
judges even in hard cases are not free to "strike out on their own" in the adjudication
of issues of law to the same extent as legislators. But Dworkin is mistaken in
supposing that the limitations and constraints placed upon judicial adjudication can be
aptly captured by the rights thesis. See section III infra.
64. See text at note 39 supra.
65. Hard Cases, supra note 3, at 1062.
66. Id. at 1096-97. As an example, Dworkin cites Warren & Brandeis, The Right
of Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193 (1890).
61. See Note, supra note 39, at 1496.
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cuts the value, if not the feasibility, of Dworkin's very distinction
between principles and policies upon which the rights thesis stands or
falls. Thus Dworkin's model comes no closer to the democratic ideal
than do the models of his opponents. Second, the Note has demonstrated that Dworkin fares no better than the positivists in meeting the
objection that judging in bard cases imposes duties on litigants ex
post facto.
B.

Policy Considerations in Adjudication

A further difficulty with the rights thesis, aside from its inability
to resolve jurisprudential dilemmas that Dworkin himself considers
crucial, is that it conflicts with the common-sense intuition that it is
sometimes appropriate for judges to consider social policies in adjudicating. It seems reasonable to suppose that most people would be
surprised by the suggestion that judges characteristically. are and
ought to be oblivious to social policies. For, indeed, there are a
variety of circumstances in which judges typically are thought to
include policy considerations in their adjudications. Consider, for
example, the following kinds of cases suggested by Kent Greenawalt:
(1) "[S]ome legal standards such as 'unreasonable search' and 'nuisance' appear to build in notions of competing costs and benefits.
. . . [l]n these instances [a judge] is properly weighing competing
social interests in deciding cases";68 (2) Judges should also take
account of social consequences "in the sense of administrability and
likely effectiveness of proposed rules";69 and (3) "[w]hen the court
knows that the legislature will not soon address a small problem
within a large area covered by legislation, again it is harder to argue
that it should refuse to take into account considerations that would be
important for a legislative body." 70 The remainder of this section
explores these three kinds of cases in which judicial consideration of
policy seems particularly appropriate. The conclusion reached is
that Dworkin is able to accommodate these apparent counterexamples
to his rights thesis only by engaging in a conceptual "gerrymandering" that abandons his original formul~tions of the principle-policy
distinction.
Dworkin explicitly considers the first of these possible counterexamples in discussing the implications of Learned Hand's formula for
negligence:
[Hand] said, roughly, that the test of whether the defendant's act
was unreasonable, and therefore actionable, is the economic test
which asks whether the defendant could have avoided the accident
68. Greenawalt, supra note 5, at 391.
69. Id. at 392.
10. Id. at 393-94.
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at less cost to himself than the plaintiff was likely to suffer if the accident occurred, discounted by the improbability of the accident. It
may be said that this economic test provides an argument of policy
rather than principle, because it makes the decision tum on whether
the collective welfare would have been advanced more by allowing
the accident to take place or by spending what was necessary to avoid
it. If so, then cases in which some test like Hand's is explicitly used,
however few they might be, would stand as counterexamples to the
rights thesis. 71

Dworkin's rejoinder is that Hand's test is really not an argument of
policy at all, but rather a method of "compromising competing
rights." 72 This can be understood, he says, once the distinction
between "abstract" and "concrete rights" is drawn. "Abstract rights
. . . take no account of competing rights; concrete rights, on the
other hand, reflect the impact of such competition." 73 Hand's test,
he urges, is not a simple cost-benefit formula but rather "a mechanism for compromising competing claims of abstract right." 74
Dworkin applies his distinction between abstract and concrete
rights to a broad range of cases:
Negligence cases are not the only cases in which judges compromise abstract rights in defining concrete ones. If a judge appeals to
public safety or the scarcity of some vital resource, for example, as
a ground for limiting some abstract right, then his appeal might be
understood as an appeal to the competing rights of those whose security will be sacrificed, or whose just share of that resource will be
threatened if the abstract right is made concrete. His argument is
an argument of principle if it respects the distributional requirements
of such arguments, and if it observes the restriction . . . that the
weight of a competing principle may be less than the weight of the
appropriate parallel policy. 75

Thus, Dworkin's view is much more sophisticated than it first appears
to be. On one hand, he wishes to maintain the position that judges
should not adjudicate on the basis of policy arguments. Yet on the
other hand, he is forced to concede that much of what looks like
adjudication by policy arguments is quite appropriate after all. Dworkin seeks to reconcile these two views by suggesting that ostensible
policy considerations are actually appeals to competing abstract
rights. In the quoted passage, for example, appeals to public
safety-what most people would consider a paradigm instance of a
collective goal-are viewed by Dworkin as appeals to a right. Unfortunately, Dworkin can only manipulate his original definitions of
rights and goals in this manner by conceding much ground to his
11.
72.
73.
74.
15.

Hard Cases, supra note 3, at 1075.
Id. at 1076.
Id. at 1075.
Id. at 1077.
Id. (emphasis added). ,
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opponents. If policy considerations can be "understood as an appeal
to competing rights," what force remains behind his original distinction between principles and policies? When is an ostensible policy
consideration to count as a "hard core" policy consideration and
when not? Dworkin's response, apparently, is that an argument is one
of principle if it respects the distributional requirement of
principles-that rights be consistently enforced76-and if it has greater
weight than the parallel or cognate argument of policy. This response is unconvincing, however, when something like public safety,
which seems so plainly a goal, can be so readily understood as a right.
Indeed, Dworkin seems to have committed himself in his examples
to the somewhat elusive position that a judge can be attentive to what
is commonly called a "policy'' just in case the "policy" has sufficient
importance in his political theory-in which case it is really a principle rather than a policy.
To be sure, Dworkin attempts to bolster his principle-policy
distinction by providing an example of what he considers a true
argument of policy. He suggests the situation in which one man is
drowning, and another man, with little personal risk, can save him:
Suppose someone argued that the principle requiring rescue at minimal risk should be amended so as to make the decision turn, not on
some function of the collective utilities of the victim and rescuer, but
on marginal utility to the community as a whole so that the rescuer
must take into account not only the relative risks to himself and the
victim, but the relative social importance of the two. It might follow
that an insignificant man must risk his life to save a bank president
but that a bank president need not even tire himself to save a nobody.
The argument is no longer an argument of principle, because it supposes the victim to have a right to nothing but his expectations under
general utility. 77
But is it so clear that this must count as a true argument of policy
under Dworkin's model? Cannot this example too be accommodated
as an appeal to competing abstract rights? Arguably, the bank's
employees as well as members of the community at large have an
abstract right to economic security. These rights might be jeopardized should the bank president drown in an attempted rescue. They
would be jeopardized much less if the "insignificant man" happened
to drown. The decision to risk only the life of the "insignificant
man" can thus be reached by appealing to competing abstract rights.
Indeed, as this example and Dworkin's treatment of Hand's formula
demonstrate, it should ordinarily be a simple matter to transform
what appears to be an argument of policy into an argument of
principle. If the transformation can always be so easily accomplished, as seems to be the case, then nothing counts conceptually as
an argument of policy, and the concept is, hence, logically vacuous.
16. See text at notes 47-49 & note 48 supra.
11. Hard Cases, supra note 3, at 1077.

1182

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 74:1167

Greenawalt's second situation in which a judge is deemed justified
in considering social consequences occurs when a judge considers the
administrability or workability of a proposed rule. Dworkin has not
discussed this possibility, but as Greenawalt projects, Dworkin probably would not deny that judges properly take such considerations into
account. 78 Perhaps Dworkin would feel that judicial consideration of
administrability is permissible in light of the fairness requirement that
rights be consistently enforced. 79 Under this view, a judge could
properly estimate whether or not a rule could be enforced in a consistent manner. Dworkin might well insist, however, that a judge
consider the enforceability of a rule from the viewpoint of fairness,
and not from that of utility. 80
According to Greenawalt, the third situation in which judges
should properly weigh social policies occurs when a legislature leaves
some areas in a piece of legislation largely open for subsequent
development by the courts. Under such circumstances, he suggests,
judges must calculate social consequences in much the same way as
do legislators. Dworkin explicitly contradicts such a view: "It would
be inaccurate . . . to say that [a judge] supplemented what the
legislature did in enacting the statute, or that he tried to determine
what it would have done if it had been aware of the problem presented by the case . . . . [Rather, a judge] constructs his political
theory as an argument about what the legislature has, on this occasion, done." 81 Though the foregoing statement is not free of ambiguity, it does at least make clear Dworkin's rejection of the notion that a
judge should put himself in the place of the legislature and should try
to determine how that body would have responded to the facts of the
case before the court; statutory construction, Dworkin states, does not
call for "hypotheses about the mental state of particular legislators.
82
• • ."
But then, is a judge to weigh social policies or not?
In a note appended to his article, Dworkin explains that a judge
must consider collective goals in such cases, yet not in the same
capacity as would a legislator: "When [a judge] interprets statutes he
fixes to some statutory language . . . arguments of principle or policy
that provide the best justification of that language in the light of the
legislature's responsibilities. His argument remains an argument of
18. See Greenawalt, supra note 5, at 392. Alternatively, if Dworkin wishes to
maintain steadfastly that judges never choose rules, then, of course, they would have
no occasion to consider the administrability of rules.
19. Hard Cases, supra note 4, at 1094. Cf. id. at 1100 ("If [a judge] believes,
quite apart from any argument of consistency, that a particular statute or decision was
wrong because unfair • . . then that belief is sufficient to distinguish the decision and
make it vulnerable").
80. Cf. id. at 1074.
81. Id. at 1087.
82. Id. at 1086.
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principle; he uses policy to determine what rights the legislature has
already created." 83 So a judge must turn to his political theory to
determine which principles and which policies best justify, or best
rationalize, the particular language of the act. 84 But a judge performing this task, Dworkin would mean to say, is not simply weighing
policies ab initio. Instead, he must determine "[w]hich arguments
of principle and policy might properly have persuaded the legislature
to enact just that statute"85 in light of the legislature's "general duty to
pursue collective goals defining the public welfare."86 In making
arguments of policy to construe a statute, a judge is further limited by
the "canonical terms" of the statute; he cannot extend an argument of
policy beyond the limits of the actual language of the statute. 87
Yet these weak restrictions obviously afford judges considerable
leeway in choosing which policies to include in their calculations and
in determining how they should be balanced. It would thus seem
that the calculation of social policies is more than a peripheral task of
a judge engaged in statutory interpretation, particularly where the
language is of a very general nature. 88 This observation reaffirms the
preliminary judgment reached above that the balancing of social
policies, Dworkin's theory notwithstanding, is at times an important
and proper aspect of adjudication.

II.

DoES ONE LITIGANT ALWAYS HAVE THE
RIGHT TO WIN?

The previous section challenged Dworkin's claim that judges
should base their decisions solely on arguments of principle. The
analysis questioned his central distinction between principles and
policies, and considered several situations in which adjudication typically involves policy considerations. It is argued in this section that,
even if we were to accept Dworkin's contention that judges should
generate their decisions only from arguments of principle, it does not
follow that he has proved his further thesis that law is a gapless
system of entitlements.
Dworkin has never veered far from his early position that "[a
judge] . . . is charged with finding, and the participants are entitled
83. Id. at 1088-89 n.23.
84. Id. at 1086.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1085.
87. Id. at 1087.
88. Consider, for example, the broad language of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 § lO(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78J(b) (1970) and accompanying SEC Rule lOb-5, 17
C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1974). It is hard to deny that the huge and complex body of
judicial decisions which has developed around these vague provisions has been
centrally concerned with policy matters. For a recent example, see Blue Chip Stamps
v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
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to have, the decision in every case that constitutes the best resolution
of the stipulated principles and policies."89 This "best" or uniquely
correct decision presumably determines the legal rights of the parties
in such a manner that one party is always entitled to judgment in his
favor. 00 The correct decision itself is defined analytically in terms of
what Dworkin has called "the soundest theory of law." 91 That is, the
judge is to decide which party has the right to win the lawsuit by first
determining which relevant theory of law is the soundest, and then by
ascertaining what this theory requires in the particular case.
The soundest theory of law, according to Dworkin, is that "set of
principles that best justifies the precedents" 92 relevant to the case
under consideration. Dworkin's first requirement for such a theory is
that it provide a coherent justification for the rule or provision at
issue.93 When relevant case law exists, this justification must take
into account not only the simple "enactment force" of the prior
decisions, but also their "gravitational force." By the former Dworkin means an opinion's precedential authority as limited by the specific
words used by the courts. The influence of a judicial decision, of
course, is not usually limited to the "canonical form of words" of the
opinion; it includes a "gravitational force" that extends beyond the
specific language of the opinion. The soundest theory, Dworkin
states, must be consistent with both.94
Coherence or consistency, however, is at most a logical prerequisite for any plausible theory of law. It cannot in itself always
determine which theory is the "best" or "soundest," since several
theories may be logically consistent with a given statutory provision or
series of decisions. 0 5 If so, how is a judge to determine which of the
available alternative theories is in fact the best? Dworkin answers by
89. Judicial Discretion, supra note 3, at 633. Dworkin is actually talking here
about his imaginary game "Policies," and not about the law. But it is clear that he
~tends his remarks to apply to the law. Id. at 634 n.7. See text at note 31 supra.
Dworkin, of course, has veered from his earlier position that judges should decide
cases by an appeal both to principles and policies. See text at note 30 & note 40
supra.
90. See text at note 32 supra.
91. See text at note 25 supra. Dworkin does not use this phrase in Hard Cases.
See note 103 infra. But the political theory of his superhuman judge, Hercules, serves
the same function. See text at notes 111-112 infra.
92. Hard Cases, supra note 3, at 1093 (emphasis added).
93. Id. at 1094.
94. Id. at 1088-89. By this distinction Dworkin presumably wishes to make the
point that the influence of an opinion can extend well beyond the particular facts of
that case. When a decision falls into disfavor in the judicial community, it is much
more likely that courts will simply "limit it to its facts," that is, to its enactment
force, rather than overrule it. Id. at 1100.
95. Sartorius, who uses the concept of coherence in a manner similar to Dworkin,
admits the "theoretical possibility" of equal coherence. Sartorius, supra note 5, at
159.
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posing the example of a judge who must apply the establishment
clause of the first amendment to a particular case, and who admits
that two distinct theories might be equally consistent with this provision. In such a circumstance, Dworkin explains, the judge "must
turn to the remaining constitutional rules and settled practices under
these rules to see which of these two theories provides a smoother fit
with the constitutional scheme as a whole." 96 That theory which fits
best not only with the constitutional provision at issue, but with the
entire Constitution, is the superior theory. In short, the soundest
theory of law is the theory that is able to justify the largest body of
law.

But, again, if the test is how smoothly a theory fits, then the
criterion remains one of logical coherence. It is possible, of course,
that there will be but one theory that is consistent with a particular
body of law, in which case the coherence test alone will determine the
soundest theory. But in many cases there may be several contenders
for the best theory, each of which is able to justify a good deal, if not
all, of a body of law. 97 Ascertaining which of these theories is most
consistent, a difficult task in itself, is complicated by the fact that the
requirement of coherence is not absolute, 98 for, as Dworkin properly
admits, some part of the legal history may be mistaken. 09 If a given
theory establishes that a certain group of decisions has been mistaken,
it must explain how it provides a better justification for legal history
than any alternative theory. 100 But the basic problem remains. Once
it is shown that the consistency of two or more theories with legal
history is roughly the same, how is a judge to decide which is
superior?
Dworkin's reply is that a judge should consider this matter "not
just as an issue of fit between a theory and the rules of the institution,
but as an issue of political philosophy as well." 101 Dworkin believes,
therefore, that the soundest theory depends in some sense on moral
and political principles, a view he also expresses in his essay Social
Rules and Legal Theory:
,
If a theory of law is to provide a basis for judicial duty, then the
principles it sets out must try to justify the settled rules by identifying
the political or moral concerns and traditions of the community
which, in the opinion of the lawyer whose theory it is, do in fact support the rules. This process of justification must carry the lawyer
very deep into political and moral theory, and well past the point
96. Hard Cases, supra note 3, at 1084.
97. Dworkin admits the possibility of the equal coherence of divergent theories.
Id. at 1084, 1104.
98. Id. at 1097.
99. Id. at 1097-1101.
100. Id. at 1100.
101. Id. at 1084.
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where it would be accurate to say that any "test" of "pedigree" exists for deciding which of two different justifications of our political
institutions is superior . . . .102
It is plain, moreover, that Dworkin views the notion of the soundest
theory as thoroughly normative:
I assume that persuasive arguments can be made to distinguish one
theory as superior to another. But these arguments must include arguments on issues of normative political theory, like the nature of society's duty of equality, that go beyond the positivist's conception of
the limits of the considerations relevant to deciding what the law is.
The test of institutional support provides no mechanical or historical
or morally neutral basis for establishing one theory of law as the
soundest. Indeed, it does not allow even a single lawyer to distinguish a set of legal principles from his broader moral or political principles. His theory of law will usually include almost the full set of
political and moral principles to which he subscribes; indeed it is hard
to think of a single principle of social or political morality that has
currency in his community and that he personally accepts, except
those excluded by constitutional considerations, that would not find
some place and have some weight in the elaborate scheme of justification required to justify the body of laws. 103
But just how a judge should appeal to "the political or moral concerns
and traditions of the community" is not made clear by these passages
alone, and requires further exploration.
Dworkin's rights thesis concerns a litigant's "institutional rights,"
not his "background rights." 104 If a judge's theory of law includes
background rights, at minimum they must not be seriously at odds
with the language of the Constitution.105 The choice between the
several theories that might meet this minimal requirement, according
to Dworkin, depends in some manner on what may be described as
"accepted" moral and political principles.
At this point it is possible to examine two distinct assumptions
102. Social Rules and Legal Theory, supra note 3, at 877.
103. Id. at 878. (sentence emphasis added; word emphasis original). Dworkin
reveals his increasing emphasis on the "issue of politic!ll philosophy," text at note 101
supra, by largely omitting from Hard Cases the locution "theory of law" in favor of
"political theory."
104. Hard Cases, supra note 3, at 1078. According to Dworkin, background
rights "provide a justification for political decisions by society in the abstract," while
institutional rights "provide a justification for a decision by some particular and
specified political institution." Id. at 1069-70.
As an illustration of this distinction, Dworkin considers a political theory which
postulates that every person has a right to property commensurate with his need.
Since this right is not recognized in our Constitution and would not be recognized by
any court, it cannot be an institutional right. Nevertheless, an adherent of this
socialist theory can claim that "people as a whole would be justified in amending the
Constitution to abolish property, or perhaps in rebelling and overthrowing the present
form of government entirely." Id. at 1070. As such, however, the adherent would be
claiming for the people what must be described as a background right only.
105. Id. at 1084.

May 19761

Dworkin's "Rights Thesis"

1187

upon which Dworkin bases the rights thesis, that law is a system of
entitlements. The rights thesis assumes, first, that "community morality," in a sense explored below, permits the development of an
objectively soundest political theory. Second, it supposes that this
political theory, once constructed, will always dictate a uniquely
correct result in hard cases. In other words, Dworkin assumes that a
soundest theory of law is theoretically feasible and that the rights
thesis would be part of that theory. It is important to keep these two
contentions distinct, for Dworkin must prove the truth of both in
order to secure his rights thesis. It is submitted, however, that he
provides no persuasive argument for either contention.
Dworkin's first proposition, that a judge ought to construct the
soundest theory by referring in some manner to "community morality," raises the question of how a judge is to appeal to moral principles
in hard cases. It is clear that Dworkin rejects the view that a judge is
free to decide simply on the basis of personally held moral principles.106 For example, a judge ought not to base a decision that
capital punishment offends the eighth amendment on a personal
abhorence of capital punishment. Rather, according to Dworkin's
theory, a judge ought to appeal to principles of "community morality"
in justifying his decisions. Since this phrase may be seriously misleading,107 it is important to clarify what Dworkin has in mind.
Dworkin stresses that it is not "a consensus of belief about a particular issue, as might be elicited by a Gallup poll,"108 but rather "the
principles that underlie the community's institutions and laws, in the
sense that these principles would figure in a sound theory of law.
• • .»1oo Elsewhere, Dworkin defines it as "the political morality
presupposed by the laws and institutions of the community": 110 that
is, the principles that are necessary to provide an adequate justification or rationalization of the laws of the particular jurisdiction. Most
frequently, perhaps, the community morality in this sense will coincide with the beliefs held by a majority of persons in a Gallup-type
survey. Nevertheless, Dworkin is prepared to grant that community
morality, in his sense, may at times diverge from popularly held moral
and political views. On such an occasion, a judge must appeal only
to the community morality as presupposed by the laws, and not to
what is popularly believed or to what he independently may believe is
morally required. 111
106. See Hard Cases, supra note 3, at 1078, 1090.
107. One writer has been misled, perhaps justifiably, by Dworkin's loose use of
this kind of language in Judicial Discretion, supra note 3, at 635, n.9. See Raz, supra
note 2, at 848-51.
108. Social Rules and Legal Theory, supra note 3, at 890.
109. Id.
110. Hard Cases, supra note 3, at 1105.
111. Id. at 1104-05. Dworkin makes this point somewhat cryptically: "The
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The soundest theory of law, then, appeals to moral and political
philosophy in the sense that it relies on those principles that underlie
the laws and institutions. Just what those principles actually are, of
course, is often a matter of debate among judges and other legal
scholars. It is no wonder that Dworkin invokes the assistance of his
judge "Hercules," "a lawyer of superhuman skill, learning, patience
and acumen," 112 to construct the soundest political theory, for no
human judge could ever accomplish the task of constructing a complete theory of law to justify all prior legal history. Yet, it is
important to keep in mind that Dworkin poses the soundest political
theory as an ideal, not as an accomplished fact of jurisprudence.
Accordingly, the inability of human judges to construct such a theory
presents no obstacle to the rights thesis if the task is at least theoretically feasible. The questi~n remains, nonetheless, whether it is even
theoretically possible to construct a political theory, along the lines
Dworkin suggests, that can be applied to decide all hard cases. It is
suggested that a certain difficulty attaches to such a task in so far as
Dworkin's conception of the soundest theory is inextricably tied to the
justification of legal history.
One type of hard case arises when a court decides that it must
discard a rule. 113 The soundest theory is that which "best justifies
the precedents,"114 and which "provides a coherent justification for
all common law precedents and . . . constitutional and statutory
provisions .as well." 115 But because Dworkin allows for a theory of
institutional mistakes, 116 a judge is given some freedoµi to determine
that a part of the legal history is mistaken. Hence, Dworkin's model
can encompass the hard case in which a court must overrule, for
instance, a single decision with no major consequences to the great
body of law. However, a theory of mistakes, although it can be used
to overturn a decision clearly at odds with the gravitational force of
other precedents, cannot be freewheeling; "it must limit the number
and character of the events than [sic] can be disposed of in that
way." 117 Yet a court may on occasion adjudge unconstitutional or
otherwise abandon a substantial portion or even the vast majority of
decisions and practices in a given area of the law.11 8 Dworkin's notion
community's morality . . • is not some sum or combination or function of the
competing claims of its members; it is rather what each of the competing claims
claims to be." Id. at 1107.
112. Id. at 1083.
113. See note 34 supra.
114. Hard Cases, supra note 3, at 1093.
115. Id. at 1094. ,
116. See text at notes 99, 100 supra.
117. Hard Cases, supra note 3, at 1099.
118. See Greenawalt, supra note 5, at 390 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966), in which the Court disapproved of many police practices). Consider also
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of the soundest theory of law runs into some conceptual difficulty in
this situation since the soundest theory, to reiterate, is simply that
which best reflects the great body of existing precedents.119 Likewise,
Dworkin's conception of the community morality, as explained above,
mirrors "the laws and institutions of the community,"120 or in other
words, the legal status quo. 121
Dworkin might wish to justify a major constitutionally grounded
overturning of prior lower court precedent on the theory that, since
the Constitution occupies the highest level in the "vertical ordering"
of authority, 122 the soundest political theory actually includes those
constitutional principles, not yet included in any judicial decision, that
would justify the overruling of an existing body of lower court
decisions and practices. But with this rejoinder, what becomes of the
initial coherence test for the soundest theory? It might be argued, of
course, that coherence is to be taken less literally, that the soundest
theory need not be consistent with existing express decisions so much
as with unarticulated principles that could be inferred from the
gravitational force of existing Supreme Court decisions. 123 This
position, obviously, makes short shrift of the coherence test as originally conceived, for the test is then no longer a purely logical one
(even aside from the allowance for a theory of mistakes), but has
been made normative in part. A judge applying a coherence test of
this sort would have to engage in what Dworkin probably would .
the substantial change in landlord and tenant law effected by those jurisdictions that
have abandoned the common-law caveat emptor rule in favor of an implied warranty
of habitability. See, e.g., Javins v. First Natl. Realty Co., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
119. See text at notes 92, 114 supra. Compare Dworkin's formulation of the
rights thesis as the proposition that "judicial decisions enforce existing political
rights. . . ." Hard Cases, supra note 3, at 1063 (emphasis added).
120. See text at note 110 supra.
121. In Social Rules and Legal Theory, supra note 3, Dworkin's view of what is
included in a theory of law, text at note 103 supra, seems somewhat broader than his
description of Hercules' political theory in Hard Cases as the theory that "best
justifies the precedents." Text at notes 92, 114 supra. Thus, Dworkin's earlier
description of the soundest theory is perhaps less open to this criticism.
122. Hard Cases, supra note 3, at 1095.
123. An even bolder proposal is suggested by Thomas C. Grey:
An essential element of American constitutionalism was the reduction to written
form-and hence to positive law-af some of the principles of natural rights.
But at the same time, it was generally recognized that written constitutions
could not completely codify the higher law. Thus in the framing of the original
American constitutions it was widely accepted that there remained unwritten
but still binding principles of higher law. The ninth amendment is the textual
expression of this idea in the federal Constitution.
Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 21 STAN. L. REV. 703, 715-16
(1975). If this is correct, it might be argued that the coherence test applies not
simply to the principles of natural rights which have been explicitly codified in our
Constitution, but also to the yet unwritten principles of "higher law." See note 124
infra.
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admit is a political, and doubtless much controverted, process of deciding how far to extend the gravitational implications of existing decisions.124
In any case, Dworkin would probably disavow this response, and
retain the definition of the soundest theory as simply that which is
congruent with the great body of existing decisions. But this notion
of the soundest theory can be criticized for its inability to accommodate the situation in which a significant and numerically substantial
portion of existing decisions and practices in a particular area must be
overturned. Indeed, it is nonsensical for a court in such a position to
claim that its decision is mandated by the theory that best fits the
precedents.
The notion of the soundest theory might be defended on different
grounds by arguing that the theory comprises the set of "true" moral
and political principles, apart from the values inherent in the laws and
institutions of the jurisdiction. But even if the idea of true moral
principles makes any sense (as it very well might), Dworkin would
not hesitate to reject this suggestion. Throughout Hard Cases he
emphasizes that a judge is bound by the values that inhere in the
institutional history of the law (i.e., the "community morality"), and
so is not free simply to base his decisions on a direct appeal to
morality. 125
Because Dworkin cannot account for the occasion on which a
court overturns a major body of precedent, he has failed to prove that
the soundest theory, in his sense, can accommodate all hard cases. 126
124. Applying the coherence test to unwritten principles of higher law, see note
123 supra, would further attribute normative qualities to the coherence test and would
thus force judges to engage in the even more clearly political process of determining
the nature of such unwritten principles.
125. See Hard Cases, supra note 3, at 1078 ("[N]o one may claim an institutional
right by direct appeal to general morality"). Cf. text at note 137 infra.
126. At times Dworkin even seems to suggest that there is no one soundest theory
at all. See Hard Cases, supra note 3, at 1105, 1107. For example, he observes that
Hercules' constitutional theory will not always be the same as those developed by
other judges "because a constitutional theory requires judgments about complex issues
of institutional fit, as well as judgments about political and moral philosophy, and
Hercules' judgments will inevitably differ from those other judges would make." Id.
at 1095.
If Dworkin means to say that Hercules' theory will be different from those of
other judges because Hercules, unlike other judges, has a comprehensive knowledge of
all legal history and makes no mistakes in reasoning, then his concession does not
undercut the rights thesis, for if another judge of similar perspicacity, for example,
Minerva, were to direct her attention to the task of working out a constitutional
theory, then Minerva's theory would be more or less identical to Hercules' and would
always dictate the same results in hard cases. However, it is more likely that what
Dworkin means in the above quotation is that judges develop different theories
because they have fundamental ethical and political disagreements. If this is
what is meant, then Dworkin has pinned his rights thesis on the highly controversial proposition that ethical disagreements are objectively justifiable. Compare Stevenson, The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms, 46 MIND 14 (1937),
reprinted in C.L. STEVENSON, FACTS AND VALUES 10 (1963) (not objectively justifia-
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But suppose, arguendo, that Dworkin is correct in contending that
there is some superior theory of law. As indicated above, the model
of law as a system of rights further requires for its success that tfie
soundest theory always dictate a uniquely correct decision. 127 Dworkin does not suggest, of course, that judges will always know which
putative political theory is the best and what that theory requires in
each particular case. On the contrary, Dworkin readily concedes that
only someone with the wisdom and perspicacity of Hercules could
have such knowledge. 128 A judge's duty, therefore, is not necessarily
to achieve this theoretical ideal, but only to do his best to discover
that uniquely correct solution. Consequently, it is no objection to
Dworkin's thesis that human judges, unlike Hercules, sometimes
make errors in their adjudication of rights. 129
Nevertheless, even after Dworkin's position is properly understood, it is far from clear that it is correct. It is not at all obvious how
even Hercules, armed with his soundest and most comprehensive
political theory, could always discern but one correct decision in the
hard case. Dworkin expends a good deal of effort in Hard Cases
discussing how Hercules is to construct his theory of law in various
area,s of adjudication, but nowhere does he explain clearly how the
model of law as an arrangement of entitlements follows from Hercules' theory. 130 There is no reason to suppose that, in a complex
case, only one decision comports with Hercules' theory of law, and
that all other decisions are wrong,1 31 unless, of course, the rights
thesis itself, that a litigant has a right to the uniquely correct decision,
is a principle included in Hercules' theory of law. Surely the bald
assertion that each case has a uniquely correct resolution is insufficient to support this controversial contention. 132
ble) with W. FRANKENA, ETHICS 110-13 (2d ed. 1973) (objectively justifiable). For
if ethical disagreements between judges are not objectively justifiable, and thus not
soluble in theory, then it can make no sense to speak of one theory of law that is
objectively soundest and it can make no sense to say that in every hard case one
litigant objectively has a right to win.
127. See text at notes 89-91 supra.
128. Hard Cases, supra note 3, at 1108-09.
129. Contra, Greenawalt, supra note 5, at 377-78.
130. Dworkin cites pages 1091-93 of Hard Cases for the argument that Hercules
accepts the rights thesis. Id. at 1088-89 n.23. Dworkin argues in this passage that
the only complete justification for the judicial practice of precedent is the "doctrine of
fairness," which requires treating like cases the same. Dworkin wants to conclude
from this that Hercules can justify the practice of precedent only by accepting the
rights thesis. At most, however, Dworkin has proved that Hercules should treat like
cases alike. He has proved neither that Hercules should use only arguments of
principle nor that one litigant always has the legal right to win a ::ivil lawsuit.
131. See MacCallum, Dworkin on Judicial Discretion, 60 J. PHIL. 638, 641
(1963) ("entitlement to the correct decision in every case" may be unreasonable if no
such decision exists in certain complex cases).
132. See note 130 supra.
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Moreover, if we consider the analogy from common moral experience, it seems clear that there are often several morally permissibfe
alternative courses of action open to an individual. Take, for example, the utilitarian moral theory that an act is right if and only if there
is no alternative act open to the individual that would bring into the
world a greater balance of good over evil. Surely the situation can be
envisioned in which several acts would generate the same amount of
good. In this situation an individual would not be required by this
utilitarian standard to choose any one over the others. Dworkin
wishes to say that the moral principles reflected in the community
morality are included in Hercules' theory of law. But if this is true,
how can he be so certain that Hercules' theory will always dictate one
correct decision when common moral experience sometimes suggests
the opposite?
This is not to say, of course, that it never makes sense to talk of a
party's entitlement to the correct decision. Plainly it does in some
cases. For example, if someone comes upon another's land and
removes timber, it is not disputed that the owner has the legal right to
. recover damages for the trespass, even though the intruder may have
believed in good faith that the land was his own133 (assuming, of
course, that the statute of limitations has not run, and that procedural
and jurisdictional requirements are properly met). But suppose a
tenant comes before a court seeking recognition of an implied warranty of habitability. Suppose further that the courts in his state, as
in most states, have consistently applied the common-law caveat
emptor rule that denies the existence of any such implied warranty. 184
Does it make sense to say that the tenant has the legal right to have
the court recognize the implied warranty when no decision in the
jurisdiction has yet done so? The tenant can be expected to argue
that the "better view" adopted by the more "enlightened" jurisdictions
calls for the abandonment of the common-law rule, and he may
present a "Brandeis brief" in support of his contention. But it would
hardly avail him to contend that the present law entitles him to a
favorable decision. His claim, rather, is that the court ought to
recognize the implied warranty of habitability doctrine-not that tlie
court has the duty to do so. Surprisingly, this is a distinction that
Dworkin himself has urged:
Sometimes we say that on the whole, all things considered, one
"ought" or "ought not" to do something. On other occasions we say
that someone has an "obligation" or a "duty" to do something, or "no
right" to do it. These are different sorts of judgments: it is one
133. See Perry v. Jefferies, 61 S.C. 292, 39 S.E. 515 (1901).
134. For a general discussion of this area of landlord and tenant law, see Annot,,
40 A.L.R.3d 646 ( 1971).
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thing, for example, simply to say that someone ought to give to a particular charity and quite another to say that he has a duty to do so.
. . . It is easy to think of cases in which we should be prepared
to make the first ... [claim], but not the second. 135
Yet it is this very distinction that Dworkin has failed to respect in his
thesis that a litigant always has a right to the uniquely correct
decision. For to contend that judges always have a duty to decide a
lawsuit in one particular manner seems to ignore the way in which
lawyers ordinarily argue and talk about hard cases. Even a~suming,
arguendo, that there is some soundest theory of law, it does not follow
that the soundest theory will always establish "duties" for a judge in
lieu of "oughts." In short, common parlance, though admittedly not
dispositive, belies the assumption that the soundest theory will only
dictate duties to a judge.
Finally, it is appropriate to consider one last argument, proffered
by Sartorius, in defense of the thesis that a judge should always
consider himself under a duty to arrive upon the correct decision:
Even if a correct philosophical account of the judicial decision process
implied that a case might arise in which the issues were sq finely balanced that there would be no one uniquely correct decision, it would
not follow that in any particular case a judge would be entitled to
act as if there was no uniquely correct decision . . . . Since there
is a uniquely correct decision in the vast majority of cases, the lack
of a judicial criterion for identifying those in which there is not implies that a judge would never be entitled to treat a case before him
as one in which there was no uniquely correct result, for in all probability it will not be. 136
This argument implicitly admits the substance of the criticisms above,
but attempts to deny that they have any practical effect. The fallacy
of this argument is not difficult to detect. It is easy to concede that
there are clear legal rights on the part of the litigants in most cases
and correlative duties ·on the part of judges. Hence, Sartorius is
correct in asserting that there will probably be one correct decision in
any randomly selected case. He has not proved or even unequivocally
asserted, however, that there is a uniquely correct decision in the
vast majority of hard cases. And this is precisely what must oe
shown to justify the inference that a judge should always treat a hard
case as if there were, in fact, a uniquely correct decision.
135. Social Rules and Legal Theory, supra note 3, at 857. Another writer has
also referred to a distinction between "ought" and "obligation" and has suggested that
in hard cases it only makes sense to speak of "the correct decision which the judge
ought to reach." Sartorius, supra note 5, at 172-73 (emphasis original).
136. Sartorius, supra note 5, at 158-59. See Sartorius, supra note 19, at 185. At
one point Dworkin remarks, "[t]he law may not be a seamless web; but the plaintiff
is entitled to ask Hercules to treat it as if it were." Hard Cases, supra note 3, at 1094
(emphasis added). Might Dworkin have this same kind of argument in mind?
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JUDGING AND UNIVERSALIZING

To rebut the rights thesis, however, is not to dismiss Dworkin's
central insight that judging is different from legislating in some very
important respects. As Dworkin explains,
The legislator may very often concern himself only with issues of
background morality or policy in deciding how to cast his vote on
some issue. He need not show that his vote is consistent with the
votes of his colleagues in the legislature, or with those of past legislatures. But the judge very rarely assumes that character of independence. He will always try to connect the justification he provides for
an original decision with decisions that other judges or officials have
taken in the past. 137

A judge is bound by the history of Anglo-American institutions and
laws in a way in which a legislator is not. This limitation is contained in the doctrine of precedent, which, as Dworkin suggests, is
justified most completely by the "fairness" requirement that like cases
be treated alike. 138 A court must consider "whether it is fair for the
government, having intervened in the way it did in the first case, to
refuse its aid in the second."139 That is, the courts can only be "fair"
by respecting in some sense the principles and justifications offered in
prior opinions.
It is proposed in this final section that judgments of legal obligation in judicial decision-making are universalizable, and that the constraint placed upon judges can best be viewed as an institutional
requirement that judges respect the universalizability of prior decisions. In its basic form, the universalizability of legal judgments is a
relatively simple thesis. If one person has a legal obligation to
perform (or forbear from performing) a certain act, then any other
person has a legal obligation to perform (or forbear from performing) the same act in relevantly similar circumstances; if a rationale or
justification is effective in one case, then it must be effective in other
cases that are relevantly similar. 140 In the literature of moral philosophy, the universalizability of moral judgments is a view most closely
associated today with R. M. Hare, 141 and one widely shared by contemporary moral philosophers. 142
137. Hard Cases, supra note 3, at 1090.
138. Id. at 1090-93. See note 130 supra.
139. Id. at 1091.
140. Cf. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, in
PRINCIPLES, PoLmcs, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAw 3, 27 (1961) (a "principled decision"
is one "that rests on reasons with respect to all the issues in the case, reasons that in
their generality and neutrality transcend any immediate result that is involved"),
141. See Hare, Universalizability, 55 PROCEEDINGS OF TIIE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY,
295 (1954-55); R. HARE, FREEDOM AND REASON (1965).
142. See, e.g., W. FRANKENA, supra note 126, at 25; B. GERT, THE MORAL RULES
192-93 (1973).
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For purposes of this Note, it is necessary only to consider the
basic elements of Hare's position. He argues that "the meaning of
the word 'ought' and other moral words is such that a person who
uses them commits himself thereby to a universal rule." 143 His thesis
is thus a logical one, in that it concerns the meaning of words; it is not
a substantive moral position. 144 Hare explains that "[i]f a person
says 'I ought to act in a certain way, but nobody else ought to act in
that way in relevantly similar circumstances,' then, on my thesis, he is
abusing the word 'ought'; he is implicitly contradicting himself."145
The moral neutrality of the universalizability thesis can perhaps be
better understood by noting that malevolent "moral" judgments are
just as universalizable as benevolent moral judgments. For example,
if X says that Y should be imprisoned because Y renders assistance to
the needy, then X has committed himself to the universal rule that
anyone who renders assistance to the needy should be imprisoned.
And, if X were himself to help the needy, he could not, without logical
inconsistency, deny that he too should be imprisoned.
Hare, however, takes the position that judgments of legal obligation are not universalizable because "a statement of law always contains an implicit reference to a particular jurisdiction; 'It is illegal to
marry one's own sister means, implicitly, 'It is illegal in (e.g.)
England to marry one's own sister.' " 146 Nevertheless, one can grant
this point and still maintain that legal judgments are universalizable
within a given jurisdiction or legal system. Hare, in fact, seems
willing to accept this at one point in his book when he says that "a
judge cannot say, without self-contradiction, 'I ought to treat cases X
and Y in different ways, though the facts of the cases are
identical.' " 147
Since universalizability is a logical thesis, it supplies no substantive content for a jurisdiction's legal rules and principles. Nor does
the thesis explain when circumstances are "relevantly similar." Nonetheless, universalizability is a significant thesis as applied to the legal
reasoning of judges, for it helps to explain why judges ordinarily feel
compelled to respect a prior decision and, if possible, to distinguish
that decision on relevant grounds from the case to be decided. In
short, the thesis of universalizability elucidates the institutional con143. R. HARE, supra note 141, at 30 (emphasis added). By a ''universal rule"
Hare means one that contains no reference to a particular individual. See Hare,
supra note 141, at 295.
144. R. HARE, supra note 141, at 30. Contra, Winston, On Treating Like Cases
Alike, 62 CALIF. L. REv. 1, 10-11 (1974).
145. R. HARE, supra note 141, at 32.
146. Id. at 36.
147. Id. at 124.
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straint placed upon judges in the form of the doctrine of precedent,148
and hence accounts for the degree of flexibility judges have in deciding hard cases. Moreover, because universalizability is a logical and
purely formal thesis, it justifies the practice of treating like cases alike,
without relying upon the vague and undefined moral requirements of
"fairness" (as does Dworkin). 149
The practice of universalizing legal judgments is not entirely
similar to an analogous practice in moral reasoning. When a judge
decides a case, he must consider his prior opinions, particularly when
they have the force of "holdings." As Hare has said, a judge cannot
admit that the facts of two cases are identical and then proceed to
decide them differently. 150 Up to this point, a judge's universalization is very much like an individual's universalization of his particular
moral judgments. A judge, of course, is not bound simply by his
own prior decisions, but by the prior decisions of other judges in his
jurisdiction. In a sense, then, it might be said that a judge must
consider these other judges as his alter-egos. Speaking on behalf of
the court, he must universalize the prior decisions of these other
judges as well as his own.151
This conception of adjudication in terms of universalization does
not require a slavish and mechanical adherence to prior cases, for it
does not compel a judge to make his decision congruent with the
greatest number of prior holdings and other provisions of law, as
Dworkin and Sartorius at times appear to suggest. 152 Universalizing
a decision does not necessarily mean that if rule r has been applied in
case A, then r must be applied again in case B, where A and B bear
some similar factual circumstances. For while A and B may share
certain similarities, they may also possess certain dissimilarities that
justify a refusal to apply r in B. In such a situation it could be said
that r is "applicable" to B, but that "its application is not warranted."153 But if the reasons r was applied in A are equally effective in
B, then universalizability requires a judge to apply r in B as a matter
of logic. Obviously whether the reasons are effective in B requires a
good deal of perspicacity on the part of the judge. Accordingly, the
process of universalization can in no sense be thought of as purely
mechanical.
148. See text at notes 137-139 supra.
149. See text at notes 161-162 infra.
150. See text at note 147 supra.
151. Cf. Sartorius, supra note 19, at 178-79 (speaking of existing decisions and
rules as "initial commitments," the departure from which a judge must attempt to
minimize).
152. See generally section Il supra.
153. See Winston, supra note 144, at 17-23.
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The doctrine of universalizability does not preclude a court from
occasionally overruling prior decisions. The judicial duty to respect
universalizability derives in large measure from the societal need to
have laws upon which citizens can rely with reasonable certainty.
Because this need is satisfied if courts follow prior precedent in the
vast majority of cases, the duty to respect universalizability need not
be so rigidly applied as to prohibit courts from retracing their steps on
rare occasions and discarding prior decisions that no longer seem
correct. On the other hand, it should be pointed out that the
overrulings of a prior case need not always involve a violation of
universalizability. In fact, the doctrine of universalizability may in
some situations mandate that an earlier holding be invalidated. A
court might decide one case by weighing certain goals and rights.
Over time, the relative weights of these goals and rights might be
altered by changed conditions. A later court faced with a relevantly
similar factual situation might therefore be in accord with the dictates
of universalizability by weighing the same goals and rights and yet,
because of the changed conditions, may arrive at a decision so contrary to the prior one that an overruling is required.
This brief discussion of the universalizability thesis may explain
what prompted Dworkin to contend that judges should ground tp.eir
decisions on principles rather than policies. He may have been
attempting to show that judges must reason only from universalizable
judgments (although he does not use this expression). There is
some evidence in Hard Cases that supports this view. Dworkin,says,
for example, that there is a requirement of "distributional consistency" in the case of arguments of principle, not present when policy
arguments are at issue. 154 By this he seems to mean that a principle,
but not a policy, must be consistently applied in like cases. 155 In
another place, Dworkin states a view that seems to coincide with the
universalizability thesis:
If it is acknowledged that a particular precedent is justified for a particular reason; if that reason would also recommend a particular result in the case at bar; if the earlier decision has not been recanted
or in some other way taken as a matter of institutional regret; then
that decision must be reached in the later case.156
Several criticisms of Dworkin's distinction between principles and
policies were considered in section I. At this point it is possible to
. recast one criticism in somewhat different terms. Dworkin believes
that judges ignore the dictates of universalizability when they take
social goals into account. He reasoned accordingly, that judges must
154. Hard Cases, supra note 3, at 1064, 1077. See text at notes 46-49 supra.
155. Hard Cases, at 1065.
156. Id. at 1093.
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consider only principles, which he takes to be exclusively universalizable. But legal judgments based on policy considerations are equally
universalizable. If it is right to decide a certain case by balancing certain goals, then it is right to decide on the basis of the same goals when
a similar case arises. For example, in Boomer v. Atlantic Cement
Co.,157 the New York Court of Appeals found that a pollution
nuisance created by defendant cement plant resulted in substantial
damage to plaintiffs' nearby properties. Yet the court discarded the
prior New York rule and refused to issue an injunction in view of its
concern for the serious economic dislocations that the community
might suffer if the plant were closed down. Surely, the Boomer
court's decision is grounded on what can only be called policy considerations. Yet there is no difficulty in universalizing the court's
judgment. After Boomer a New York Court should not enjoin a
nuisance without first weighing the possibility of serious economic
detriment to the community.
The objection to Dworkin's distinction between principles and
policies can now be more clearly stated. Dworkin mistakenly believes that universalizability can only be respected if the content of
what judges can properly consider is limited to rights. Thus, he
states that "[t]here can be . . . no general argument of fairness that
a government which serves a collective goal in one way on one
occasion must serve it that way, or even serve the same goal, whenever a parallel opportunity arises." 158 Yet judgments based on both
rights and goals are universalizable and can be considered by judges
in their adjudications as long as subsequent courts appeal to the same
kinds of rights and goals in similar cases.159
Universalizability also places in better perspective Dworkin's
claim, with which this Note agrees, that there are constraints placed
on judging that are not placed on legislating. 160 Legislators, qua
lawmakers, have little or no institutional duty 161 to judge (that is,
vote) the same way in relevantly similar circumstances. 162 Thus, for
157. 26 N.Y.2d 219,257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970).
158. Hard Cases, supra note 3, at 1092.
159. Cf. Sartorius, supra note 19, at 180 ("[I]t is not any social policy but only
those policies and principles which are established in prior judicial obligations, or
which may be derived from those which are so established, which provide good
reasons for judicial decisions").
160. See text at note 137 supra.
161. By "institutional duty" this Note means the duties a person assumes by virtue
of occupying a certain role, station or office. See Beran, Ought, Obligation and Duty,
50 AUSTRALASIAN J. PHIL. 207, 216 (1972); Brandt, The Concepts of Obligation and
Duty, 73 MIND 374, 387-89 (1964); Hart, Legal and Moral Obligation, in EssAYS IN
MORAL PHILOSOPHY 82, 103-04 (A. Melden ed. 1958); Lemmon, Moral Dilemmas, 71
PHIL. REv. 139, 140-41 (1962); Mish'alani, 'Duty', 'Obligation' and 'Ought', 30
ANALYSIS 33, 33-35 (1969).
162. Constitutional restraints, of course, serve to limit legislative arbitrariness,
and to this extent impose institutional duties upon legislators.
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example, Congress one day may choose to "bail out" Lockheed from
its financial difficulties and the next day refuse to "bail out" New
York City from threatened default even though it believes that the two
situations are relevantly similar. Of course, when a legislator ignores
the requirements of universalizability in this manner, he in effect
makes logically contradictory judgments (assuming, ex hypothesi,
that the two cases are relevantly similar). A judge, on the other
hand, has a relatively powerful institutional duty to respect universalizability in adjudicating, a duty that perhaps springs in part from the
fact that the law can serve as an action-guide only if there is an
over-all consistency in the rationales that judges assert in their opinions. The principle of stare decisis is simply a label for this institutional duty.
·
Yet, there is nothing inherent in the requirement of universalizability that always entitles one party in a civil lawsuit to judgment in
his favor. It is true that judges are bound by an institutional duty to
respect the reasons given for decisions in prior cases, and, to this
extent, cannot assume the role of "deputy legislators." But Dworkin
claims too much in supposing that the requirements of universa.lizability engender a gapless system of entitlements on behalf of litigants.
The thesis of universalizability does not suggest that there is some
soundest theory of law, nor that there is always a uniquely correct
decision. From time to time judges will inevitably differ on what
counts as a relevant similarity or difference between cases. Furthermore, just which reasons and justifications are the actual grounds for
prior decisions will often be a matter of interpretation, about which
there may be disagreement. Therefore, different judges can, on
occasion, be expected to universalize prior cases in different ways. In
such cases it makes little sense to speak of a court as being under an
institutional duty to decide in one particular way, or, correlatively, to
say that a party has a right to a particular decision. Universalizability
simply requires a judge, when he is reasoning his way to a decision in
a hard case, to reconcile his decision with whatever he considers to be
similar cases in precedent, and to determine whether the reasons
given in the prior cases apply to the case he is judging. But unless
the authorities are very clear and persuasive (in which circumstance
he is presented with an easy rather than a hard case), there will not
always be one correct decision that is objectively justified to the
exclusion of all other possible decisions.
Dworkin's fallacy has been to suppose that the law must be
conceived as a seamless web of entitlements if judges are not to be
taken as quasi-legislators. In proposing the thesis of universalizability of legal judgments, this Note has attempted to describe a middle ground.

